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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JOHN RICHARD KOCHER, : Case No. 981513-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for one count of 
Exercising Unlawful Control Over a Motor Vehicle, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 
(1993)1; one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1998); and one count of Interference With a 
Peace Officer Making an Arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995). Jurisdiction is 
conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (1996) whereby the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
over appeals from the district court for a conviction in a 
criminal case other than for a first degree or capital felony. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The following pertinent statutes are reproduced in full and 
attached as Addendum A: 
1
 This section has been amended and renumbered as Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-la-1314 (1998) , with the amendment being effective May 5, 
1997. However, the current version of the statute is identical in 
pertinent part to the statute as it read in April, 1997. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 (1993); 
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence; 
Rule 4 02, Utah Rules of Evidence; 
Rule 4 03, Utah Rules of Evidence; 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a 
conviction of unauthorized control over a motor vehicle 
("joyriding") when the owner of the vehicle did not testify that 
the vehicle had been taken without her permission? 
Standard of Review. A jury conviction will be reversed when 
the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which 
he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 
1983). In applying this standard, this Court "review[s] the 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it 
in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury." Id. 
Preservation of the Argument. At trial, defense counsel 
made a motion for a directed verdict to dismiss the theft charge 
on the basis that the state had failed to present sufficient 
evidence to establish one of the necessary elements of that 
crime. (R. 108:309-10)2; see Addendum B. Specifically, the 
motion was based on a lack of evidence sufficient to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Tamara Troester had not given 
2
 The entire transcript of the trial is contained in one 
volume marked "R. 108." Appellant refers to that record cite, with 
the internal page numbers listed after "R. 108:." 
2 
Mr. Kocher permission to use the vehicle. (R. 108:310). 
2. Whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying 
Appellant's motion for mistrial after the state's witness 
improperly testified regarding inadmissible other crimes 
evidence? 
Standard of Review. Appellate courts reverse a trial 
court's denial of a motion for mistrial where the trial judge 
abused his or her discretion. See State v. Kiriluk, 969 P.2d 
1054, 1060 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 
1230 (Utah 1997). 
Preservation of the Argument. This issue was preserved at 
R. 108:167-68, 193-202; see Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an Information dated July 30, 1997, the state charged 
Defendant/Appellant John Richard Kocher ("Appellant" or 
("Mr. Kocher") with Count I: Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a second 
degree felony; Count II: Possession of a Weapon by a Restricted 
Person, a third degree felony; Count III: Possession of 
Methamphetamine, a third degree felony; and Count IV, 
Interference with a Peace Officer Making an Arrest, a class B 
misdemeanor. R. 3-6. Pursuant to Appellant's motion, the trial 
judge severed the weapon possession charge from the other 
charges. R. 32, 108:9. Prior to trial, Appellant also filed a 
motion in limine, requesting "the state be precluded from 
introducing evidence of prior bad acts as prohibited by the Utah 
Rules of Evidence 404(b)." R. 33. At the start of the trial, 
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the trial judge heard argument on that motion and issued a 
ruling. R. 108:7-9. 
A jury trial was held on April 29 and 30, 1998. R. 108. 
During the course of the trial, Appellant made a motion for 
mistrial. R. 108:193-200. The trial judge denied the motion. 
R. 108:200. 
After both sides rested, Mr. Kocher made a motion to dismiss 
the theft of a motor vehicle charge. R. 108:309-10. The motion 
was unsuccessful, and the jury convicted Kocher of the lesser 
included offense of joyriding, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 (1993), possession of 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1998); and interference with a 
police officer, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995). R. 108:322-23. 
On July 23, 1998, the trial judge sentenced Mr. Kocher to 
prison. R. 89-90. See Addendum D containing judgment. 
Mr. Kocher filed a timely notice of appeal on August 18, 1999. 
R. 98. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Although the Information alleged in support of Count I that 
Mr. Kocher "obtained or exercised unauthorized control over 
the . . . vehicle of Tamara Troester" (R. 3), Ms. Troester did 
not testify. Instead, the state called Kenneth Troester as its 
first witness. R. 108:122. 
Mr. Troester testified that he and Tamara were the owners of 
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the 1995 Monte Carlo involved in this case. R. 108:123. He did 
not have any documentation which indicated his joint ownership of 
the car. R. 108:124. 
Ms. Troester was the person who ordinarily drove the car. 
R. 108:124. She was using the car on April 12, 1997, the date of 
the incident in this case. R. 108:123. 
Although Mr. Troester did not ordinarily drive the car and 
was not driving the car on April 12, 1997, he testified that he 
did not give Mr. Kocher permission to drive the car. R. 108:123. 
Mr. Troester acknowledged that it would be possible for 
Ms. Troester to give someone permission to drive the car without 
informing him. R. 108:124. He also indicated that Ms. Troester 
told him that she had left the car running with the keys in it, 
and Mr. Troester concluded that the car had been stolen. 
R. 108:125. 
On April 12, 1997, Cari Lee Reeves was parked with the 
driver's door of her car next to a green car, in the parking lot 
of a Circle K located at 4699 South 4800 West, Salt Lake County. 
R. 108:128, 132. She testified that a man walked between the two 
cars, coming from behind the cars. R. 108:129. She thought he 
was going to go into the store. R. 108:129. Instead, the man 
turned around, looked into the car next to her, walked around, 
got in the car, and drove away. R. 108:129. 
The man seemed agitated, as if he were in a hurry. 
R. 108:130. The tires squealed as the car backed out. 
R. 108:135. 
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Ms. Reeves thought the car had been stolen because the man 
did not come out of Circle K, and "there was a lady standing in 
there and I guess she had just noticed that her car was gone." 
R. 108:130, 131. Ms. Reeves did not identify the "lady" as 
Tamara Troester or otherwise describe her. R. 108:127-39. 
Ms. Reeves identified the man who drove away in the green 
car as Appellant. R. 108:132. She had also selected him from a 
photo array, but had difficulty making that selection. 
R. 108:135, 143. 
Officer Daniel Delao responded to a call at the Circle K. 
R. 108:147. He talked to Ms. Troester, then put out an attempt 
to locate on the vehicle. R. 108:148. The officer then spoke 
with the cellular phone company which provided service for the 
cell phone in the vehicle. R. 108:148. He learned that the cell 
phone in the vehicle had repeatedly dialed a specific phone 
number during the past few minutes. R. 108:150. 
The officer obtained the address for the phone number which 
had been dialed. R. 108:150. He went to that address, 1879 
South 300 East in Salt Lake City. R. 108:151. 
At the address, Officer Delao saw the car in the driveway, 
then saw a man he identified as Mr. Kocher start to get into the 
car. R. 108:152-53. Delao and another officer blocked the 
driveway with their cars. R. 108:154. Delao then identified 
himself as an officer. R. 108:156. The man stepped out of the 
vehicle, said something like "Don't shoot," then began backing 
up. R. 108:157. 
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According to Delao, as the man backed up, he lowered his 
hands to his waistband and moved around the car. R. 108:158. 
The other officer removed his canister of pepper spray, but 
dropped the canister as he started to deploy it. R. 108:159. At 
that point, the man began to run. R. 108:159. The officer 
grabbed him as he started to climb a fence. R. 108:159. 
The officer and Mr. Kocher ended up facing each other. 
R. 108:160. Delao testified that Mr. Kocher hit him in the 
stomach and a scuffle ensued. R. 108:160. Delao indicated that 
Mr. Kocher7s behavior was consistent with someone who was under 
the influence of some type of drug. R. 108:178. 
During the scuffle, Delao saw a gun which he pulled from 
Appellant's waistband. R. 108:161. Delao struck Mr. Kocher 
several times with his baton to subdue him. R. 108:164. During 
a search of Mr. Kocher after taking him into custody, the officer 
found a pager, a hypodermic needle and a white-yellowish rock-
like substance which a crime lab employee later identified as 
methamphetamine. R. 108:170, 184. The pager had six calls which 
ended in the number "911." R. 108:182. 
Officer Delao also testified that during the search of 
Appellant, he found two books of stolen checks. R. 108:167. 
Appellant objected and the trial judge ordered that the testimony 
about the "stolen" checks be stricken and instructed the jury to 
disregard any reference to the checks. R. 108:168. Appellant 
reserved a motion for mistrial, which he later made. R. 108:169, 
193. 
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Stacy Nelson, Mr. Kocher's girlfriend, testified for the 
defense. R. 108:205-223. At the time of this incident, 
Ms. Nelson was receiving threats from Terry Lewis, who was 
associated with the Sundowners. R. 108:206. Apparently, 
Mr. Lewis met Stacy as part of the "meth circle" and he had gone 
after her because of previous confrontations he had with Stacy's 
father. R. 108:207, 208.3 Stacy had been kidnapped and beaten 
about a month before the incident in this case. R. 108:209, 220. 
She thought she had also been raped, but could not remember 
because she was drugged. R. 108:223, 231-32. 
On the day of this incident, Ms. Nelson received more 
threats from Terry Lewis. R. 108:209, 210. One of those threats 
was about being taken to a clubhouse, which meant being beaten 
and raped. R. 108:215. Stacy, who was at a house at about 1800 
South and 3 00 East, paged Mr. Kocher several times, using numbers 
ending in 911 as a code. R. 108:210. The numbers signified 
"Stacy to John, it's an emergency." R. 108:211. She did not 
call the police that day because she did not think they would 
help her because she was a methamphetamine addict. R. 108:214. 
Stacy had been up for a couple days and was very scared by the 
threats. R. 108:217, 219. 
Mr. Kocher arrived at the 1800 South house and was frantic 
because he thought Stacy might already have been taken. 
3
 Although Ms. Nelson was in treatment when she testified, 
she had previously been addicted to methamphetamine. R. 108:2 07. 
Methamphetamine is a stimulant which increases anxiety, impairs 
judgment and causes paranoia. R. 108:191-192. 
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R. 108:217. Stacy asked about the car and he told her he got it 
a Circle K. R. 108:217. She told him he needed to return it and 
Mr. Kocher told her that he planned to. R. 108:217. 
Appellant also testified that Stacy was being threatened by 
Terry Lewis, and had paged him with the emergency messages. 
R. 108:234. Mr. Kocher had been staying awake at night, 
protecting Stacy, and it had been several days since he slept. 
R. 108:235. 
On the day of the incident, Mr. Kocher left to try to get a 
job, while Stacy went to the house of her friend Tiffany. 
R. 108:236. While at a friend's house working on a car, 
Mr. Kocher ingested methamphetamine. R. 108:24 0. He also 
received emergency pages from Ms. Nelson. R. 108:23 6. 
Mr. Kocher ran out of the house believing, in his altered state, 
that he could run to Tiffany's house and save Stacy. R. 108:23 6. 
When Mr. Kocher got to the Circle K, he saw the car running 
and "figured it would be okay for me to borrow it to go over to 
the house to make sure [Stacy] was all right." R. 108:237. He 
got in the car and headed for Tiffany's house. R. 108:23 7. 
Mr. Kocher tried to call the owner of the vehicle using the cell 
phone. R. 108:237. He kept getting a busy signal because he was 
calling the cell phone number and did not realize it due to his 
intoxicated state. R. 108:237. After he arrived at Tiffany's 
house, Stacy yelled at him "for having somebody else's car," and 
he "figured the only way to get ahold (sic) of the lady was to 
get some kind of number or address off the registration . . . of 
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the vehicle." R. 108:238. 
Minutes after Mr. Kocher arrived, the police arrived. 
R. 108:218-219. He was frightened by the guns to his head, and 
scared that he was going to get shot. R. 108:23 8. He originally 
thought it was some of Mr. Lewis' friends, and then tried to 
avoid being shot or beaten. R. 108:238-239. 
Mr. Kocher acknowledged that he imagined he had possession 
of methamphetamine. R. 108:24 0. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
To support a conviction for joyriding, the prosecution must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Mr. Kocher exercised 
unauthorized control over the vehicle of another; (2) such 
control was without the owner's permission; and (3) Mr. Kocher 
had the intent to temporarily deprive the owner of possession of 
the vehicle. 
The prosecution failed to prove that Mr. Kocher's use of the 
vehicle was without the permission of the owner, Tamara Troester. 
The testimony of Kenneth Troester that he did not give such 
permission does not prove whether Tamara Troester gave her 
permission for Mr. Kocher to use the vehicle. Nor does the other 
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Tamara Troester did not give Mr. Kocher 
permission to use the vehicle. 
The trial judge abused his discretion in denying Appellant's 
motion for mistrial. The judge had ordered in limine that 
evidence of other bad acts was not admissible. This ruling was 
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correct since the state did not present a witness who established 
that the checkbooks were "stolen" and the evidence was irrelevant 
and highly prejudicial. 
The prosecutor did not inform the state's witness that 
testimony regarding "stolen" checkbooks found in Appellant's 
possession was improper. The officer improperly testified that 
Appellant had stolen checkbooks in his possession when arrested. 
This inadmissible other crimes evidence prejudiced Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PROSECUTION DID NOT BEAR ITS BURDEN OF 
PROVING BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT TAMARA TROESTER 
DID NOT GIVE HER PERMISSION FOR MR. KOCHER TO USE THE 
VEHICLE. 
A conviction must be reversed when the evidence "is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." 
Petree, 659 P.2d at 444. Constitutional Due Process requires the 
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of a 
criminal offense with which a defendant has been charged. 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 (1977); State v. Cox, 
751 P.2d 1152 (Utah App. 1988). 
Mr. Kocher was convicted of joyriding in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 (1993), an offense which consists of three 
elements that must be proven by the prosecution: "(1) exercising 
'unauthorized control over' someone else's vehicle, (2) without 
the owner's permission, and (3) 'with intent to temporarily 
deprive the owner . . . of possession of the motor vehicle.'" 
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State v. Carruth, 947 P.2d 690, 693 n.8 (Utah App. 1997) 
(omission in original) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 
(1995)) . 
Instruction No. 20 set forth these elements. R. 67. 
Instruction No. 20 required the state to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the following elements: 
1. That on April 12, 1997 in Salt Lake County 
Utah the defendant, JOHN RICHARD KOCHER 
2. exercised unauthorized control over a motor 
vehicle not his own, without the consent of the owner 
or law custodian and 
3. that he had the intent to temporarily deprive 
the owner or lawful custodian of possession of the 
motor vehicle. 
R. 67.4 By failing to present testimony of Tamara Troester, the 
owner and custodian of the car, as to whether the car was taken 
"without the owner's permission," the state failed to establish 
its burden. See Carruth, 947 P.2d at 6 93 n.8. 
4
 While reading the instructions to the jury, the trial judge 
improperly sua sponte changed instruction number 18 (R. 64) , the 
elements instruction for theft of a motor vehicle. He indicated 
that instruction number 18 required a finding that Appellant 
"obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the vehicle of 
Tamara Troester [or Ken Troester]." R. 64, 108:277-78. The 
written instruction discussed with the parties required the jury to 
find that Appellant exercised unauthorized control over the vehicle 
of Tamara Troester, and did not include Ken Troester as an 
alternative owner. R. 64. Appellant objected to the change and to 
the judge's sua sponte action in inserting Ken Troester as an 
alternative owner. R. 108:310. The jury acquitted Appellant of 
that offense. 
Instruction number 20, the elements instruction for joyriding, 
required the jury to find that Appellant took the car without the 
consent of the owner or lawful custodian. R. 67. Even if Ken 
Troester were a co-owner, this instruction required a finding that 
none of the co-owners consented, i.e. a finding that Tamara 
Troester did not consent. 
12 
The marshaled evidence in support of the jury's finding as 
to this element is as follows: 
1. Kenneth Troester's testimony that he did not 
authorize Mr. Kocher's use of the vehicle (R. 108:123); 
2. Cari Lee Reeves' testimony that she thought the car 
was stolen because Mr. Kocher did not come out of the 
Circle K, and an unidentified "lady was standing in there 
and I guess she had just noticed that her car was gone" 
(R. 108:130, 131); 
3. Stacy Nelson's testimony that Mr. Kocher told him 
he got the car at the Circle K and that she told him to 
return it (R. 108:217); 
4. Testimony that Officer Delao responded to call at 
the Circle K and spoke to "the victim Ms. Troester" 
(R. 108:147-48); 
5. Evidence of Mr. Kocher's actions when the officers 
approached him in the driveway (R. 108:157); and 
6. Mr. Kocher's testimony that he saw the vehicle 
running and "figured it would be okay for me to borrow it to 
go over to the house to make sure [Stacy] was all right" 
(R. 108:237). 
When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, this 
evidence fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Mr. Kocher exercised unauthorized control over a motor vehicle 
not his own. 
The Information alleged that Mr. Kocher exercised 
13 
unauthorized control over the vehicle of Tamara Troester. R. 4. 
Although Kenneth Troester testified that he also owned the car, 
he acknowledged that the car was primarily Tamara's to drive and 
that she had control over it on April 12, 1997. R. 108:123-24. 
Additionally, he acknowledged that she could have given someone 
permission to drive without telling him. R. 108:123-24. 
Mr. Troester's testimony that he did not authorize Kenneth to 
drive the car fails to establish that Ms. Troester did not 
consent. 
Mr. Troester's additional testimony that the car was stolen 
and that he had been told Tamara left the car running in the 
parking lot likewise fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Tamara did not consent. The statement that the car was 
stolen was a conclusion that the jury needed to make. The 
statement about the car being left running was hearsay, something 
about which Mr. Troester had no personal knowledge, and failed to 
establish that Tamara had not given Mr. Kocher permission to 
drive the car. See Rules 801, 802 and 602, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
Cari Lee Reeves' statement that an unidentified lady 
appeared to have noticed that her car was missing and Ms. Reeves' 
own belief that the car had been stolen likewise do not establish 
that Tamara did not consent. The testimony fails to establish 
that Tamara Troester was the "lady" and does not establish that 
the owner of the green car did not give permission for it to be 
driven. 
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Stacy Nelson's testimony that Mr. Kocher told her he got the 
car at the Circle K and that she told him to return it also does 
not establish that Mr. Kocher took the car without the owner's 
consent. That exchange could have occurred regardless of whether 
Mr. Kocher was given permission to take the car. 
The fact that Officer Delao arrived at the Circle K in 
response to a call and spoke with "the victim, Ms. Troester" 
before putting out an attempt to locate on the car also does not 
establish lack of consent. Police are frequently called to 
investigate situations in which it turns out that no crime has 
been committed. Additionally, officers put out attempts to 
locate in situations that do not result in charges. Indeed, 
introduction of a police report by the state, even if it outlines 
all elements of a crime, is not acceptable. See State v. Bertul, 
664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983) . Instead, the state is required to put 
on a live witness even though the witness has previously told the 
officers that a crime occurred, in order to establish that a 
crime actually occurred. 
Moreover, any statements from Tamara Troester to the officer 
were unreliable and inadmissible hearsay. See Lee v. Illinois, 
476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986)(citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 
n.4 (1980)); Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence. The state is 
required to put on a live witness even if the witness had 
previously told the officer a crime occurred. 
Officer Delao's testimony regarding Mr. Kocher's behavior 
when the officers approached likewise does not establish that 
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Mr. Kocher intentionally took the car without permission. 
Appellant's behavior could have been consistent with innocence on 
the theft charge, or based on possession of a weapon, or the 
result of ingesting methamphetamine. See State v. Bales, 675 
P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983) (recognizing that flight evidence can be 
"contradictory as to its motive," fully consistent with 
innocence, and/or evidence of guilt of something other than the 
crime charged); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 791 (Utah 
1991)("evidence of flight or concealment of a crime does not 
support an inference of intentional conduct on the part of the 
accused"). Mr. Kocher7s behavior when officers approached him 
could have been completely unrelated to the theft of a motor 
vehicle charge. 
Mr. Kocher testified that he saw the vehicle running and 
"figured it would be okay for me to borrow it to go over to the 
house to make sure [Stacy] was all right." R. 108:237. He also 
testified that he planned to return it. Id. The state could 
have asked Mr. Kocher whether he had permission to take the car, 
but did not. R. 108:234-44. Mr. Kocher's testimony as it stands 
fails to establish that Mr. Kocher intentionally took the vehicle 
without Ms. Troester's consent. The state needed the testimony 
of Ms. Troester to establish this element. Without that 
testimony, it failed to sustain its burden of establishing that 
Appellant committed the crime of joyriding. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL. 
Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion in limine 
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requesting "the state be precluded from introducing evidence of 
prior bad acts as prohibited by the Utah Rules of Evidence 
404(b)." R. 33. At the start of the trial, the parties briefly 
argued this motion. R. 108:7-8. The judge granted the motion 
"with the exception to the testimony regarding items missing from 
the vehicle," but allowed the defense to renew the motion as to 
those items later. R. 108:8-9. The motion was apparently later 
renewed at the bench, and as acknowledged by the prosecutor and 
judge, the judge ordered that the state not mention the stolen 
checkbooks. R. 108:193, 198, 200. 
The prosecutor neglected to inform the officer that he was 
not to refer to stolen checks. R. 108:195, 198. When the 
prosecutor questioned Officer Delao, the officer referred to 
stolen checks, in violation of the pretrial order. R. 108:167. 
The following exchange occurred: 
Prosecutor: What did you locate [when searching 
Appellant]? 
Officer: In the pants pocket of the suspect there 
were a few things; there was a hypodermic 
needle--actually not in his pocket, but 
the hypodermic needle was next to him. 
The--according to my report here, 
there's--there's two books of stolen 
checks and a yellowish--
R. 108:167 (emphasis added); see Addendum C containing transcript 
of testimony relevant to this issue. Defense counsel immediately 
objected. R. 108:167. The trial judge ordered that "the 
statement referenced by this officer to any checks that may have 
been stolen" be stricken. R. 108:167. He then instructed the 
jury as follows: 
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Members of the jury panel, that is not charged nor 
relevant nor material in this case, and one of the 
functions that I have is to insure that the--as the 
evidence gets past me to you, that it is both, is 
legally relevant and not prejudicial. 
Sometimes extrinsic things get said that really aren't 
germane or pertinent to the charges before you and--
and reference to these other materials doesn't — isn't 
legally relevant with respect to the charges before us 
today, so I'm going to ask you to disregard any 
reference, utterance made by this or any other witness 
to matters that are not legally pertinent, specifically 
the last statement made by this officer regarding some 
checks which were--may or may not have been found and 
may or may not have been stolen or whatever, that has 
no bearing whatsoever in this case and you're just to 
disregard that utterance in its entirety and I'll order 
it stricken. Okay? 
R. 108:167-68. 
Appellant moved for a mistrial. R. 108:193; see Addendum C. 
Since the judge had previously ruled that the evidence was 
inadmissible, the argument revolved around the prejudice caused 
by this testimony. R. 108:193-200. 
The trial judge denied the motion. R. 108:200. He found 
that the error was inadvertent, and offered to give the jury an 
additional curative instruction. R. 108:201. Appellant declined 
the additional instruction, pointing out that calling even more 
attention to the information would compound the problem. 
R. 108:202. 
As a preliminary matter, the trial judge correctly issued an 
order in limine precluding the state from introducing evidence 
that Appellant had stolen checkbooks in his possession when 
arrested. Possession of stolen checkbooks by Appellant was not 
relevant and therefore was inadmissible since it did not have 
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"any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." Rules 401 and 
402, Utah Rules of Evidence. Additionally, the testimony was not 
admissible under Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence since it was 
evidence of another bad act to show that Appellant acted in 
conformity therewith, and did not fall into any of the Rule 
404(b) categories for admissibility. Moreover, admission of the 
evidence violated Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence since the 
prejudicial effect substantially outweighed the nonexistent 
probative value. This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have 
repeatedly recognized "the inherent and unavoidable inflammatory 
potential" of other crimes evidence and the "dangers to the 
fairness and integrity of a trial" caused by such evidence. See 
State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 490 (Utah 1997) .5 In this case, 
where the evidence had little or no probative value, the 
prejudicial effect of conveying information of this other bad act 
to the jury outweighed any probative value. 
Additionally, no foundation evidence was presented as to who 
owned the checkbooks and any testimony by the officer that they 
5
 The Utah Supreme Court amended Rule 4 04(b), effective 
February 11, 1998. A Committee Note attached to that amendment 
indicates that the amendment is intended "to return to the 
traditional application of Rule 404 prior to Doporto." The 
prejudice caused by other crimes evidence was well acknowledged in 
Utah case law prior to Doporto. See e.g. State v. Saunders, 699 
P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985) (evidence of prior crimes is presumed 
prejudicial); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 
1988) (other crimes evidence "tends to skew or corrupt the accuracy 
of the factfinding process"); State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 
(Utah 1989). 
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were stolen was hearsay, admitted in violation of Rule 801, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Apparently, the state intended to use Tamara 
Troester to testify that various items were stolen from her car. 
R. 108:194. When Ms. Troester did not testify, the jury was 
"left to speculate . . . as to whether it was her checks, the car 
owner's checks, or somebody else's checks." R. 108:194. 
Admission of such evidence was therefore improper. 
Officer Delao's testimony regarding stolen checkbooks was 
prejudicial and requires a new trial. As set forth in Point I, 
supra at 11-16, the state did not present evidence from Tamara 
Troester as to whether she had given Mr. Kocher permission to 
drive the car. Additionally, Mr. Kocher presented evidence 
indicating that he intended to return the car. Moreover, 
Appellant presented evidence of justification or necessity--that 
Terry Lewis was threatening Ms. Nelson and Appellant needed the 
car to save her. Rather than convicting Appellant of theft of a 
motor vehicle as charged, the jury was convinced of at least some 
of the defense evidence since it convicted Mr. Kocher on the 
lesser charge of joyriding. 
Under these circumstances, the outcome on Count I might well 
have been more favorable to Appellant if the jury had not been 
improperly informed that Mr. Kocher possessed stolen checks. 
Instead, the jury likely assumed that Mr. Kocher was a bad person 
based on this testimony and speculated as to whose checks they 
were. As defense counsel pointed out, the state referred to a 
"stolen" vehicle during the trial; reference to "stolen" checks 
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might well have improperly convinced the jury that the car was 
also stolen. Given that the evidence did not establish that 
Ms. Troester did not give Appellant permission to use the car, a 
question as to Appellant's intent existed, and the threats from 
Mr. Lewis provided a complete defense, the improper testimony 
prejudiced Appellant. 
The trial judge gave a cautionary instruction, specifically 
referring to the evidence of stolen checks, immediately after the 
testimony. R. 108:167-68. This cautionary instruction did not 
undo the damage; indeed, it emphasized the evidence for the jury. 
As defense counsel pointed when asked whether he would like an 
additional instruction, "I don't think that we can unring the 
bell." R. 108:194-195. 
While recognizing that curative instructions play an 
important role in our criminal justice system, the lead opinion 
in State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998) also recognized that 
curative instructions are not a "cure-all," and that "[s]ome 
errors may be too prejudicial for curative instructions to 
mitigate their effect, and a new trial may be the only proper 
remedy." Harmon, 956 P.2d at 273; see also id. at 278-79 
(Durham, J. concurring)(expressing concern about the 
effectiveness of and possible prejudice caused by curative 
instructions). The error in this case, informing the jury of 
other crimes evidence, was too prejudicial to be mitigated by a 
curative instruction. Accordingly, Appellant respectfully 
requests a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant John Richard Kocher respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse his convictions and remand this case for a new 
trial. 
SUBMITTED this 3di*. day of April, 1999. 
Ch^e.ulDy 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
KAREN STAM 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
41-la-1311. Unlawful control over motor vehicles, trailers, 
or semitrailers — Penalties — Effect of prior con-
sent — Accessory or accomplice. 
(1) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to exercise unauthorized control 
over a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the consent of 
the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to temporarily deprive the 
owner or lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-
trailer. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied 
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to 
the control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a differ-
ent person. 
(3) Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to or an accomplice 
in, an unauthorized taking or driving is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Kule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evi-
fcdence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
afatute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; excep-
tions; other crimes. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this 
rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the 
requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998.) 
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1 THE COURT: Would you do that and as you do that, 
2 would you use the lectern and carefully kind of twist that 
3 forward. Do you know, that wire is literally hanging by a 
4 thread and we've broken it again. 
5 MS. BARTON: Oh. I'm sorry, your Honor, I 
6 probably--
7 THE COURT: That's okay, you need to move it, 
8 swivel it, I wish it were on a little bit of a swivel, but 
9 if it moves more than a couple inches, it doesn't have a lot 
10 of variance and if it moves too far, then the wire rips out, 
11 so you did just fine. I wish it actually had a built-in 
12 swivel and then it would--we wouldn't be breaking the wire 
13 off, but you did just fine. 
14 MR. MACK: Well, isn't Weldon in charge of this 
15 stuff? 
16 THE COURT: He is — he's fixed that--
17 MR. MACK: He--you know, he's gotten you 
18 everything else. 
19 THE COURT: He's been on his hands and knees--
2 0 (Inaudible) 
21 THE COURT: That's right. 
22 MR. MACK: Okay. Judge, are we on? 
23 THE COURT: I think we're on. 
24 MR. MACK: The first thing is, we would make a 
25 motion to dismiss for failure to establish one of the 
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elements of theft as outlined in the Information. It was, 
as stated throughout the trial and even argued in closing, 
that--that John Kocher obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the operable motor vehicle of Tamera Troester 
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
We understand the State had a problem with--with 
procuring her presence here during trial and put on Mr. 
Troester who claimed to be co-owner of the car, who said 
that he did not give permission to anyone to use the car. 
He--I don't think there was any testimony one way or the 
other whether he knew that his wife had given anyone 
permission to use the car. 
It was argued throughout that it was her car and 
only in the reading of the instruction element--elements 
instruction on theft, the Court changed it to Ken or Tamera. 
And we--we object to that. The State has to do that, we 
would have opposed that if they had done that and our motion 
is to dismiss that count based on that. 
The next thing, your Honor, is our objection to 
Instruction No. 22, which was the State's instruction--
THE COURT: I just want to stop here for a moment. 
I'm just--
MS. BARTON: May I respond? 
THE COURT: I want Ms. Stam--now, you know, when 
you have co-counsel, you have to be on the same sheet of 
ADDENDUM C 
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1 || detailed search. Actually I called for medical at the same 
2 I  time I was performing a detailed search of the suspect. 
3 Q What did you do to conduct the search of the 
4 defendant? 
5 A Checked the waist line, checked pockets, checked 
6 legging, just overall for--for weapons or contraband. 
7 Q Did you locate anything? 
8 I A I did. 
9 Q What did you locate? 
10 A In the pants pocket of the suspect, there were a 
11 few things; there was a hypodermic needle--actually not in 
12 his pocket, but the hypodermic needle was next to him. The-
13 -according to my report here, there's--there's two books of 
14 stolen checks and a yellowish--
15 MS. STAM: Your Honor, objection. The--if we 
16 could have a motion outside the--the--there were no stolen 
17 checks, that--he--the officer was instructed not to say 
18 anything about stolen checks. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. I understand. Okay. At this 
20 time, what I'm going to do is just--is order stricken the 
21 statement referenced by this officer to any checks that may 
22 have been stolen. 
23 Members of the jury panel, that is not charged nor 
24 relevant nor material in this case, and one of the functions 
25 that I have is to insure that the--as the evidence gets past 
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1 me to you, that it is both, is legally relevant and not 
2 prejudicial. 
3 Sometimes extrinsic things get said that really 
4 aren't germane or pertinent to the charges before you and--
5 and reference to these other materials doesn't — isn't 
6 legally relevant with respect to the charges before us 
7 today, so I'm going to ask you to disregard any reference, 
8 utterance made by this or any other witness to matters that 
9 are not legally pertinent, specifically the last statement 
10 made by this officer regarding some checks which were--may 
11 or may not have been found and may or may not have been 
12 stolen or whatever, that has no bearing whatsoever in this 
13 case and you're just to disregard that utterance in its 
14 entirety and I'll order it be stricken. Okay? 
15 Let's--
16 THE WITNESS: Sorry, your Honor. Sorry, Ms. Stam. 
17 THE COURT: Understand. Understand. Okay. 
18 One thing that might be really helpful is, let's 
19 see, why don't you re-state the question and let me just 
20 say--add this parenthetically to the jury and assistance to 
21 the officer here. 
22 With respect to any report, you're entitled to do 
23 one of two things. One, you can either pause in ask--
24 answering a question, peruse your written report, use that 
25 as a means of refreshing your recollection and then you can 
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MS. STAM: Your Honor, before we would put on any 
evidence, we'd ask the Court for a brief recess, outside--or 
brief time to have the record outside the presence of the 
jury, if they could take a short break. 
THE COURT: Okay. What we'll do then is, let's go 
ahead and excuse the jury and we'll stay with counsel and 
with the accused here and give you the benefit of the record 
for whatever motions you want to make. 
Okay. Ms. Stam? 
MS. STAM: Your Honor, we'd like to make a motion 
for mistrial. Mr. Mack is going to argue that motion. We 
filed pretrial motions asking that--that other matters not 
be included in evidence, we made a motion at the beginning 
of Court today. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Mack? 
MR. MACK: Judge, if I could just--your Honor, as-
-as Karen stated, she had filed a motion in limine, we 
expanded on that this morning. We--we were very specific 
about what things we were concerned about prohibiting the 
mention of. We talked about the checkbooks at the bench. 
We had an agreement, we had a stipulation, we had an order, 
as we understand it. 
Then that, advertently or--or inadvertently was 
elicited by the prosecutor from the State's witness. It's 
not something we--we backed into accidentally, it came from 
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the State and the State's witness. 
It — it's ordinarily probably not as big a deal, 
but in this case, it's a very big deal, we feel, because it-
-it goes right to the heart of our defense and--and that is 
that there is no intention, there was no intention to 
permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle in this case. 
The State, in—in opening, stated that the jury 
would hear from Tamera Troester, the car owner, that certain 
items of her had been taken from the car. Presumably that 
was mentioned because they hoped to bolster that theory of 
intent to permanently deprive based on Mr. Kocher being in 
possession of--of other stolen property from this car, and 
if he's in possession of property that's out of her car, 
then he probably meant to keep her car, too. 
Well, as things unfolded, she—she's not here. 
That evidence was not--didn't come from anybody. No 
evidence about him being in possession of anything from the 
car. 
Therefore, your Honor, it--it's extremely 
prejudicial. Even though you have given a curative 
instruction to the jury, they have heard that he was in 
possession of stolen property. It--it didn't go beyond 
that, they--you know, they're left to speculate, I guess, as 
to whether it was her checks, the car owner's checks, or 
somebody else's checks. It doesn't matter, though, and I 
1 I  don't think that we can unring the bell that they--that 
2 they've heard, that he was in possession of stolen property. 
3 Throughout the trial, and I think it's been 
4 objectionable that there's been reference made to stolen 
5 car, stolen car. Well, that's--that's what this trial is 
6 about, proving that this car was stolen. 
7 And--and however, you know, however innocent or--
8 or advertent-inadvertent it was, I--I think there's just 
9 huge damage that's been caused by that statement. And I--I 
10 think that you'll--Ms. Barton has apologized to Ms. Stam 
11 saying that she neglected, I believe, to inform her witness 
12 that that was how we were proceeding and that's--you know, 
13 I'm sorry if that's the case, but that's--that's too bad. 
14 You know, the--the damage is done and--and she had an 
15 obligation to inform her witness, all her witnesses about 
16 those things that were not on the--on the table during this 
17 trial. And that hasn't happened. 
18 And I think that the only recourse is a mistrial 
19 at this point. 
20 THE COURT: Mr. Mack, the thing I'm not clear 
21 about is the--I'm not buying on frankly the nexus between 
22 him being--a statement that he's in possession of stolen 
23 checks and how that necessarily leads to the notion that he 
24 had the intent to steal the car. 
25 That in fact--let me just say, it seems to me that 
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1 it is, in my view, it's probably more compelling the other 
2 way. That, in other words, if one--if a person were to take 
3 possession of a car for the purpose of taking the contents 
4 out, I mean that--that may be why he took possession of the 
5 car, not to steal the car, but to take the contents out. 
6 The fact that he is in possession of something 
7 thatf s stolen whether it' s out of the car or from some other 
8 party, I don't know how that--how we get to there, to jump 
9 the hurdle that that's any evidence of intent to deprive the 
10 owner. 
11 MR. MACK: Well, because I don't think there is 
12 any otherwise, Judge. I think otherwise the State is left 
13 without him being in possession of anything stolen, other 
14 than the car that they're saying is stolen--
15 THE COURT: Right. 
16 MR. MACK: --there's nothing to suggest that he 
17 wasn't ever going to return it or had plans to return it or-
18 -or anything of the like. They don't know whose checks they 
19 might or might not have been. All they know is, he's in 
20 possession of a couple of stolen checkbooks--
21 THE COURT: Okay. Well, how does that make it--
22 MR. MACK: --which makes him out to be a thief. 
23 THE COURT: How does that make it more or less 
24 likely that he was going to return the car? 
25 MR. MACK: Well, I don't know. I think it makes 
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1 it more likely that, in their minds that he wasn't 'cause 
2 they'll think, well, here's a guy who has--he doesn't care 
3 about other people's property, he doesn't care about these 
4 people's checks that he's got, so why should we think he's 
5 ever going to return this car? Of course, he's going to 
6 come in here now and say, yeah, I was going to return the 
7 car, that's what my intention was all along. I'm an honest 
8 person. 
9 Well, they--they now know that the officer says he 
10 was in possession of stolen--other stolen property. I think 
11 the "other stolen property" is the problem. I don't think 
12 it matters who it belonged to, I don't think, you know, 
13 obviously they don't know who it belonged to, but it just 
14 changes his--his character, changes his posture completely. 
15 If he--he takes the stand or--I--I anticipate that 
16 he is going to, we've discussed that although we haven't 
17 finally decided that, and says, I was going to return it--
18 honest I was going to return it, they're going to say, yeah, 
19 sure you were, just like you were going to return those--
20 those checkbooks to people. 
21 You know, it's just so improper and--and that's 
22 why we brought that up specifically because it's a big 
23 problem.* 
24 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Mack. I 
25 understand your position. Thank you, sir. 
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Ms. Barton? 
MS. BARTON: Your Honor, let me say first of all 
that I--the motion in limine, not to--not to sound flip, but 
it was rather a laundry list of things, and not that that 
excuses it--not that it excuses the mention of any of those 
things, from my perspective that was my duty to inform my--
my witness; however, I did admonish him as to the 
defendant's felony status, I admonished him as to the 
restricted person charge and I admonished him of several 
other things. 
I don't want the Court to think that this is in 
any way Officer Delao's fault because it's not. I did not 
specifically mention to him the checkbooks; however, I 
argue, your Honor, strenuously, that this is not overly 
prejudicial and the Court has given a curative instruction 
and there really, I don't believe, is any further prejudice 
beyond that point. 
The jury has been instructed not to consider it 
and the--the question that was asked was not intention--was 
not intended to invoke that response. It was an open-ended 
question, I asked what was recovered off of the defendant's 
person, I did not ask about any stolen property. It was an 
inadvertent mistake. The jury can see that and the fact 
that no charge regarding stolen property appears on the 
Information is on its face evidence to the jury that that 
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was not prejudicial to the defendant, that apparently 
nothing ever came of that. They're not being asked to 
consider that evidence. 
And your Honor, this--there--there is no evidence 
that the defendant was intending to return the vehicle in 
this case and that' s what they need to show for the lesser 
included; so for them to say that the State hasn't shown any 
evidence of his intent to steal the vehicle, I think is--is 
incorrect. The issue is, was there any evidence of his 
intent to return the vehicle, which there was none. 
I--I don't feel that this has been prejudicial to 
this case in any way that would cause error. The curative 
instruction, I think solves the problem and we should 
proceed with the defense's case. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Mack, anything else? 
MR. MACK: Well, Judge, I think the--the statement 
about whether there's been any--whether we've shown any 
evidence that he intended to return the car is--is--we're 
not required to show anything at all, but we intend to 
demonstrate some evidence. They--they don't show any 
evidence that he--that he--to indicate that he wasn't going 
to--that he was going to keep the car or not going to return 
the car, except now that they, you know, that the jury's 
heard from one of their witnesses that this is a guy who has 
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1 || other stolen property and so what are they going to think? 
2 I  Of course, they're going to think that, that he--here's a 
3 guy with other stolen property, he's in a car that's not his 
4 so yeah, he, you know, he's going to keep the car, he wasn't 
5 going to return it. It just guts our defense of the case. 
6 And it was very important to us, that's why we 
7 brought it up, that's why we were very specific about it, 
8 and--and the fact that we may have had a laundry list 
9 doesn't matter, it doesn't matter how long it was, it was 
10 agreed to, it was ordered by this Court and--and it was an 
11 oversight and now it's out and you know--and that's a 
12 problem. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I'm going to deny 
14 the motion for a mistrial. I think that the--oh, I suppose 
15 there's gradations of prejudice or harm in terms of the 
16 error and based on the context of how it came in 
17 particularly, I don't have any belief other than it was 
18 wholly inadvertent and is not a matter of the State trying 
19 to somehow shoe horn in something that otherwise could not 
20 come in through the front door, get in the back door. I 
21 think this was absolutely through inadvertence. 
22 You know, the truth of it is, we require on direct 
23 examination non-leading questions and open-ended questions, 
24 you can't necessarily control the response, that's why it's 
25 a non-leading question, so the fact that something came in 
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1 that shouldn't have come in is regrettable. I wish I had 
2 some way of turning the clock back and not having it, but I 
3 don't. All I can do is make the curative instruction and in 
4 my view, Mr. Mack and Ms. Stam, I think that the--that there 
5 is no substantial residual damage or error to the--to the 
6 detriment of the defendant. 
7 Did--I will invite this and I guess there's really 
8 some conflicting motivations, maybe, that--that--and I 
9 understand if you don't want me to do anything more, I 
10 won't; if you'd rather have an appellate court look at it in 
11 the status that it is, I just want to offer to you if you 
12 would like me to make any additional curative instructions 
13 or amplify again in the--there is the one boilerplate 
14 instruction that says you're not to consider evidence which 
15 is ordered stricken out and that sort of thing. 
16 If, in addition to that instruction, if you want 
17 me to emphasize this particular faux paus again to the jury, 
18 I will. If in your judgment, you think it is better left 
19 un-lack of attention called to it, I'll do whatever you 
20 think is best, Mr. Mack or Ms. Stam, in order to minimize 
21 the likelihood of any collateral consequence to your client. 
22 Again, I don't believe there will be any. I don't 
23 think that--I think the jury can follow the instruction, I 
24 think they'll disregard it. I think that--I think they 
25 will, I hope they will, I told them to do so and again I'm 
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1 I  not sure there's really been a direct inference that--that 
2 cuts in favor of intent to deprive on the motor vehicle to 
3 have these other collateral issues. 
4 Are you interested in having me re-address or re-
5 state more emphatically or state a different way any 
6 curative instruction with respect to this, Mr. Mack or Ms. 
7 Stam, or would you rather I just leave it? 
8 MR. MACK: Judge, I think we think that that 
9 compounds the problem, that--
10 THE COURT: Okay. 
11 MR. MACK: --despite the suggestion that they 
12 ignore something, especially the more you--
13 THE COURT: To continue to call--
14 MR. MACK: --say ignore it, they won't, but they 
15 can't ignore something they've heard anyway, so we don't 
16 want you to say anymore. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And I'll just 
18 go ahead and leave it the way it is and leave it with the 
19 boilerplate jury instruction that tells them again to 
20 disregard any stricken out evidence and of course that falls 
21 in this gamut. 
22 I will not be making it specifically and your 
23 objection is noted for the record. I think it certainly is 
24 very clearly stated, I appreciate and acknowledge your 
25 position. I think it's just a question of reasonable minds 
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